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LEADING ARTICLEJason Chuah*
‘One Belt One Road’, Sub-Regional Transport
Agreements and the CMR – a case of mutual
dependency?
The Convention on the Contract for the International
Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) 1956 came into force
in July 1961, and has been ratified by a majority of
European states. Its Preamble states quite explicitly that
the signatories ‘having recognized the desirability of
standardizing the conditions governing the contract for
the international carriage of goods by road, particularly
with respect to the documents used for such carriage and
to the carrier's liability.’ That drive to standardisation
and harmonisation has led to more calls, on its sixtieth
anniversary, for better consistency of decisions or inter-
pretations of its provisions between contracting states.
That call is undeniably important as concerns about sus-
tainable transport and globalisation of commerce are in-
evitably becoming more influential in the judicial and
legal interpretation of the CMR provisions.
This article does not depart from the general concern that
the CMR should continue to evolve for the betterment
of international road carriage. However, it argues further
that the evolution should not ignore the global dimen-
sions of the treaty, especially the slower development of
international road carriage law elsewhere in the world,
and, as regards this article, the emphasis being on Asia as
directed by policy of the People’s Republic of China
(hereafter, the PRC). The East, influenced by the PRC,
it is argued, is faced with three options – one, as is the
current trend, the adoption of sub-regional multilateral
agreements with CMR influences; two, the adoption of
the CMR principles into domestic law;1 and three, the
adoption of the CMR wholesale.
It has been said that the ‘CMR is something of a vintage
Volkswagen that keeps chugging along the arteries of
modern commerce blinking with bemusement at the
modern world of electronic data exchange and logistics’.2
That must surely be true in Europe – that is however not
the state of affairs in Asia where lorries with bales of
textiles, drums of oil and pallets of washing machines still
ply the many land routes of Asia with not a container3
or an electronic consignment note in sight. This exempli-
fies the CMR’s dilemma – reform in Europe and leave
the rest of the world behind, or strike a compromise?
What sort of compromise – a two speed CMR? These
are indeed challenging considerations. Using the legal
provisions in these sub-regional agreements, notably the
Greater Mekong Sub-regional Agreement as a case study,
this article will show how the provisions, though possess-
ing a CMR flavour, differ from the CMR. It seeks to ex-
plore some of the values prized in the current sub-region-
al Asian road transport agreements and questions
whether and to what extent those values could and should
be accommodated in an evolving CMR.
From a theoretical point of view, it might be said that a
multilateral treaty which influences the legal development
elsewhere is one which serves well its raison d'être in
creating new international legal norms.4 Those interna-
tional legal norms would arguably in turn become cus-
tomary international law.5 From another perspective, if
a multilateral treaty which originally sought global reach
is only catering to the needs of a few, an honest reassess-
ment of its role is called for. As regards the CMR, its
continued evolution through case law largely (and under-
standably) directed by European jurisdictions has the
potential of alienating itself from other jurisdictions
across the globe. That is especially problematic given the
current geopolitics – the PRC and Russia occupy large
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An option which was mooted in Africa, though without much success. In 2000, the Organisation pour I'Harmonisation du Droit des
Affaires en Afrique (OHADA-OHBLA) circulated the text of a Draft Uniform Act on Contracts for the Carriage of Goods by Road for
1.
consultation. The instrument is clearly based on the provisions of the CMR but the OHADA did not go so far as to advocate a ratification
of the CMR. The draft Uniform Act was intended merely to serve as a template for domestic legislation. There was no purported interna-
tional reach. See generally F. Ferrari, ‘The OHBLA draft Uniform Act on Contracts for the Carriage of Goods by Road’, International
Business Law Journal (2001), 898.
M. Clarke, ‘The Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 1956: wilful misconduct again – and again’,
Journal of Business Law (2008), 184.
2.
See generally Globalisation, Transport and the Environment (OECD Publication 2010) (text available at google books
https://books.google.co.uk/) at 133. In some countries, it is not always a matter of the lack of technology – indeed, in India for example,
3.
administrative regulations make it impossible for containerised transport to cross land borders (India-Bangladesh; India-Nepal; India-
Pakistan). So all containerised carriage has to be by sea. See A. R. Mohammad/Y. Basnett (eds.), Regional Integration in South Asia: Trends,
Challenges and Prospects (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2014), 332.
M. Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’, Brit. YB Int’l L. 47 (1974-75), 1; Richard R. Baxter, ‘Multilateral Treaties as
Evidence of Customary International Law’, Brit. YB Int’l L. 41 (1965), 275.
4.
This position is not without controversy – see J.I. Charney, ‘International Agreements and the Development of Customary International
Law’, Wash. L. Rev. 61 (1986), 971 who writes: ‘Recently, however, writers, international courts, and statesmen have given support to the
5.
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tracts of land mass and thereby should be natural constitu-
ents for a convention such as the CMR, but these are also
countries with deep mistrust of an international legal or-
der directed by ‘Western’ values.6
Context and Background – the PRC Agenda
It is outside the scope of this article to detail the complete
background of the road transport developments in Asia.
In this sixtieth year of the CMR, there are however some
noteworthy developments to consider. First, the ‘one
belt one road’ project – the PRC government established
a steering committee to lead on the ‘one belt one road’
project in 2014.7 The grand scheme, building on a notion
of the ancient silk road, has at its core the linking of the
PRC to the rest of the world through a number of ‘cor-
ridors’. These are not physical corridors as such but spa-
tial corridors of economic cooperation and investment.
Key to these corridors is land transport. The project has
since been linked to other international endeavours from
the Asian Development Bank and the Shanghai Cooper-
ation Organisation.
International cooperation in this region on matters relat-
ing to the carriage of goods by road and rail is not new.
Efforts have attracted various levels of success – at times
let down largely by the lack of infrastructure, poor ad-
ministrative governance and lack of political will.8 Those
international cooperative efforts are often expressed in
sub-regional agreements. The notable ones are:
– ASEAN Agreements on Transport Facilitation;
– Agreements of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community
(EurAsEC) and the Customs Union of Belarus,
Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation related to
Transport Facilitation;
– ECO Transit Transport Framework Agreement
(TTFA), 1998;
– Basic Multilateral Agreement on International
Transport for the Development of the Europe-
Caucasus-Asia Corridor (TRACECA), 1998;
– Greater Mekong Sub-regional Agreement for Facil-
itation of Cross-Border Transport of Goods and
People (GMS-CBTA), 1999;
– Agreement on the Cross-Border transport of Per-
sons, Vehicles and Goods within the Framework of
Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
(CAREC), 2010;
– Agreement between the Governments of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Member
States on Facilitation of International Road Trans-
port, 2015.
These sub-regional agreements can certainly be pivotal
to the PRC’s ‘one belt one road’ policy. The ‘one belt
one road’ scheme has been seen by a good number of
multinational corporate entities as pivotal to the emerging
‘China plus one’ business strategy.9 The ‘China plus one’
strategy, as readers will appreciate, stems largely from
the fact of rising labour cost in the PRC and the perceived
business need to reduce the risk of supply chain disrup-
tions, tariff burdens, onerous bureaucracy and currency
fluctuations. The essence of the strategy is that businesses
would continue to exploit the manufacturing strength
and market volume in the PRC whilst moving their de-
pendence on the PRC labour market elsewhere, prefer-
ably, with easy access to the PRC.
The Sub-regional Perspective – GMS-CBTA
Against this international business and geo-political
backdrop, the UN has urged Asian countries, including
the PRC, to sign and ratify seven of the most important
road transport treaties.10 However, there is significant
inertia. No south-east Asian country – Indochina, PRC,
Korea, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc. – has ratified or
signed the CMR. As far as the PRC is concerned, it has
ratified only two out of the seven: the Customs Conven-
tion on Containers, 1972 (ratified in 1972) and more re-
cently, the Customs Convention on the International
Transport of Goods under Cover of Transit International
Routier (TIR) Carnets (TIR Convention), 1975 (ratified
in 2016). The reasons for the inertia are clearly many but
it is also imprudent to over-generalise the issue of polit-
ical will of an entire continent. It suffices for our purposes
that there is a lack of acceptance of a global solution or
approach by a good number of these countries, despite
dulcet diplomatic noises.
The position has not been very much better as regards
the sub-regional agreements. It is submitted that ignoring
the issue of political will and social development, the sub-
regional transport corridors (the so-called ‘hardware’) in
Asia are not always supported by ‘software’ (trade facil-
view that international agreements, with little more, could give rise to new customary international law that is binding on all states regardless
of whether or not they participated in the negotiations or became parties to the agreement. There is even some support for the view that
international agreements that are not yet in force could give rise to instant international law. Such developments in the rules for establishing
customary international law would have profound implications for the international legal system.’ (at 971) (footnotes omitted); see also
J.L. Kunz, ‘The nature of customary international law’, American Journal of International Law 47(4) (1953), 662; A. M. Weisburd, ‘Cus-
tomary international law: the problem of treaties.’ Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 21 (1988), 1.
Infra.6.
For a detailed geo-economic report of the project including its financial aspects, see the Financial Times Special Report at
www.ft.com/reports/new-trade-routes-silk-road-corridor.
7.
See the Asian Development Bank’s Technical Assistance reports on the various countries/regions coming within its remit – notably the
more recent reports relating to Georgia (2016) (at www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/185249/47220-001-tacr-01.pdf),
8.
Myanmar (2015) (www.adb.org/projects/documents/mya-dev-asset-mgmt-prog-roads-nov-2015-tacr); South East Asia – South Asia
(2015) (www.adb.org/publications/regional-transport-infrastructure-mapping-projects).
See generally S. Witchell/P. Symington, China Plus One (2013) at www.fticonsulting.com/~/media/Files/us-files/insights/journal-arti-
cles/china-plus-one.pdf.
9.
These are the Convention on Road Traffic, 1968; Convention on Road Signs and Signals, 1968; Customs Convention on the International
Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention), 1975; Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of
10.
Commercial Road Vehicles, 1956; Customs Convention on Containers, 1972; International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier
Controls of Goods, 1982; and Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR), 1956.
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itation policies and processes). Missing infrastructural
links in many sub-regions have clearly also reduced the
effectiveness of land (road and rail) transport projects
underpinned by these sub-regional agreements.
This paper considers the Cross-Border Transport Facilit-
ation Agreement (CBTA) contained in the Greater
Mekong Sub-regional (GMS) Agreement as a vital case
study in the current somewhat gloomy legal landscape.
The umbrella GMS Agreement had initially endured the
same lethargy as the other sub-regional agreements. It
was initiated in 1992 by the six countries situated along
the Mekong River. With the support of the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (ADB), those six countries agreed to the
GMS Economic Cooperation Programme. Cross-border
land transport was increasing and it was quickly recog-
nised by the ADB and the constituent countries that trade
facilitation and community development would only be
brought about through proper legal facilitation of the
cross-border traffic. The CBTA was initially signed by
Thailand, Vietnam and Laos in 1999, seven years after
the launching of the GMS Economic Cooperation Pro-
gramme. Two years later, in 2001, Cambodia acceded to
the agreement. That was followed by the PRC in 2002
andfinally, Myanmar in 2003. The accession to the CBTA
by the PRC was pivotal. The PRC clearly saw the CBTA
as an important plank in its geopolitical and transnational
economic policies. Moreover, the PRC’s position as a
key player in the region meant that progress on full im-
plementation could develop apace. This is arguably an
early sign of the PRC’s determination to take a lead on
implementation of these sub-regional agreements.
The ADB has lauded the CBTA as ‘a pioneering landmark
accord, which consolidates, in a single legal instrument,
all of the key nonphysical measures for efficient cross-
border land transport’.11 It is indeed true that the CBTA
is particularly ambitious. It includes specific provisions
to (i) enable vehicles (on designated open routes), drivers
(with mutual recognition of driving licences and visa fa-
cilitation), and goods (with regimes for dangerous and
perishable goods) to cross national borders through the
GMS road transport permit system; (ii) avoid costly
transhipment through a customs transit and temporary
importation system and a guarantee system for goods,
vehicles, and containers; (iii) reduce the time spent at
borders, through single-window inspection, single-stop
inspection, information and communication equipment
and systems for information exchange, risk management,
and advance information for clearance; and (iv) increase
the number of border checkpoints implementing the
CBTA in order to maximise its network effects and eco-
nomies of scale.12
From a CMR point of view, it is especially pertinent that
the GMS CBTA contains a truncated and modified ver-
sion of the CMR.13 Of course, the GMS CBTA is not
unique in this – other sub-regional agreements have also
made such accommodation possible, for example the
ASEAN Facilitation Agreement for Multimodal Trans-
port, the ECO TTFA in Article 27 and Annex VI, and
more recently, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Member States Agreement on Facilitation of International
Road Transport. There are distinguishing features of the
GMS CBTA which make it relevant to the methodology
of the present research. Perhaps this is best explained
through the process of elimination.
First, the ASEAN Agreements are essentially multimodal
transport agreements – understandably because the
volume of trade moving between the ASEAN countries
is still largely dominated by sea carriage.
As to the ECO TTFA, the Economic Cooperation Or-
ganization (ECO) was established in 1985 by Pakistan,
Iran, and Turkey as a trilateral organisation to promote
regional cooperation, and was later expanded in 1992 to
include seven new members, namely the Islamic Republic
of Afghanistan, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic
of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the Republic of Uzbek-
istan.14 There is no significant capital injection into the
land transit scheme – hence, although the aspirations are
lofty, they have not been always mirrored in reality.
Furthermore, there are significant legal and institutional
challenges impeding the full and proper implementation
of the ECO TTFA. Take for example, the attempted in-
corporation of the TIR Convention into the regional
cooperation agreement. The TIR provisions operate on
the basis that there are maximum axle load requirements.
Certain countries in the ECO, Pakistan for example, do
not have an adequate system for measuring axle load in
the first place.15 So for an ECO founding country like
Pakistan, it needs to accede and ratify the TIR Conven-
tion before there can be effective implementation of the
ECO TTFA. It should also be highlighted that unlike
the GMS CBTA, not all ECO states are signatories to
the ECO TTFA.16
The SCO case is highly interesting as we are currently
witnessing political investment from the PRC in the
project. However, it is too soon to be used as a template
to evaluate the transposition of CMR provisions into the
regional scheme. In contrast, despite infrastructural con-
straints,17 the GMS countries have not only ratified and
acceded to all the annexes and protocols but have actually
started to put in place practical implementation of the
provisions.
Asian Development Bank, Greater Mekong Subregion Cross-Border Transport Facilitation Agreement: Instruments and drafting history
(Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2011), 2.
11.
Ibid.12.
As set out in Art. 24 and Annex 10.13.
‘Sustainable socio-economic development for people of the region’, Economic Cooperation Organization, www.ecosecretariat.org/in2.htm.14.
See USAID Trade Project ‘Legal & Policy Gap Analysis for Economic Cooperation OrganizationTransit Transport Framework Agreement’
(June 2014), 5 (http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K24J.pdf).
15.
Among the 10 ECO member countries Uzbekistan is not signatory to the ECO TTFA, while Turkmenistan has signed, but has not yet
ratified the Agreement.
16.
Details of achievements and challenges in implementing the CBTA are provided in Stocktaking of Progress in Achieving the Action Plan
of the Second GMS CBTA Joint Committee Meeting, Report for the Third Joint Committee Meeting, Vientiane, Lao PDR. Part V also
provides the implementation status of the CBTA. (www.gms-cbta.org/online-resources).
17.
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Last but not least, the GMS CBTA is a highly relevant
case study where the role of the PRC is concerned for
the reasons stated above.
The GMS Annex 10 – A Baby CMR?
Annex 10 of the GMS CBTA provides for the conditions
of carriage by road. The intention is to avoid having to
re-invent the wheel; hence, a good number of the provi-
sions are clearly redolent of the CMR. However, a survey
of the provisions soon reveals that there are some impor-
tant differences – and not merely from the technical point
of view, but as regards approach and spirit. To what de-
gree that is by design or not is perhaps not especially
fundamental. What matters is what those differences are
and what they can reveal about the future for internation-
al road carriage in the region.
Scope of application
Article 2 is a useful starting point for this evaluation. It
provides that the Annex ‘shall apply to the contract of
carriage of goods for reward by road in a motor vehicle
when the place of handing over the goods to the carrier
and the place of delivery to the consignee are situated in
the territories of different Contracting Parties’. It goes
on to state that the Annex would not apply to carriage
performed under the terms of any international postal
conventions. This provision benefits from simplicity. It
does not lay down the jurisdictional restrictions that
Article 1 of the CMR does. There, the CMR only applies
if the contract specifies that the place of taking over of the
goods and the place designated for delivery are situated
in two different countries, of which at least one is a con-
tracting country, irrespective of the place of residence
and the nationality of the parties. The GMS CBTA Annex
does not enter into the definition of the contract – it at-
tempts to leave the matter simply as a question of fact,
and perhaps, one might add, common practical sense.18
This legal manoeuvre avoids the potentially knotty issue
of characterisation – what constitutes a contract, how the
contract should be interpreted and the role of implied
terms and usage. The Annex takes, instead, a pragmatic
approach – the matter is largely left to the relevant
tribunal. The deliberate avoidance of a legalistic approach
to the road carriage scheme will be seen repeated in the
Annex.
One aspect which is not left to chance is the issue of ‘re-
ward’. Unlike the CMR, which leaves the issue as a
question of fact for the tribunal seised with jurisdiction,
Article 3 of the Annex sets out explicitly the principles
for determining the price of the carriage. It should be said
that the word ‘reward’ is not actually defined but Article
3 lays down some fairly tight rules on how the price
should be set. It states:
‘(a)The transport price will be freely determined by
market forces, but subject to antitrust restrictions, so as
to avoid excessively high or low pricing.
(b) Contracting Parties and transport operators shall re-
frain from any measures, agreements, or practices tending
to distort free and fair competition, such as cartels, abuse
of dominant position, dumping, and state subsidization.
They shall be denied any effect and be null and void.
Contracting Parties shall ensure that their respective
transport operators conform to this percept.’
It could thus be said that the Annex is more than simply
about regulating the carriage of goods but also providing
for fair competition between operators within the region.
Part of this agenda might be seen to be the influence of
the ADB which took a significant interest in promoting
the Agreement.19 Additionally, it was also clear that al-
though during the negotiations of the CBTA, some GMS
countries had not yet become members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO),20 throughout the drafting
of the annexes and protocols in the negotiation meetings,
due diligence was taken to ascertain that the CBTA an-
nexes and protocols are aligned with the WTO frame-
work. Hence, the CBTA is broadly consistent with the
principles of the WTO including free markets and fair
competition.21 From a PRC point of view, during their
negotiations to become part of the GMS CBTA, they
were clearly envisaging WTO membership. Of course it
could not be said whether that played a significant role
in the negotiations involving the PRC, but at that time
there would be no countenance by the PRC of an inter-
national political stance which detracted from WTO
principles.
The notion of carriage
The Annex should also be examined on the basis of what
has not been expressly provided for – there is no mention
of multimodalism or successive carriage. The term ‘carri-
er’ is defined quite tersely in Article 1 as ‘a person who
undertakes to carry goods for reward’. It thus places all
liability for the transit on the carrier (Article 6). Under
Article 5(c) the carrier is vicariously liable for the acts
and omissions of his sub-contractors – it remains to be
seen if ‘sub-contractors’ would be construed to include
other carriers in successive carriage and/or multimodal
transportation. Again, the intention behind Annex 10
(and indeed, other annexes) was to provide a basic
framework rather than to prescribe highly technical or
conceptual matters for the parties to agree on.
As more mature contracting states to the CMR have
found out, multimodalism and successive carriage are not
likely to diminish in impact on the road carriage liability
regime. Insurers and other stakeholders are only more
likely to seek clarity on the allocation of liability between
carriers. It is thus argued that in this respect, a review of
It does, in Art. 4, provide for a consignment note to evidence the contract of carriage – the terms of that Article are similar to the provisions
of Chapter III of the CMR.
18.
See the Minutes of the Proceedings involving the ADB in the negotiations leading to the GMS CBTA at www.adb.org/countries/gms/sector-
activities/transport.
19.
Cambodia became a WTO member on 13 October 2004; Vietnam became a WTO member on 11 January 2007; and Lao PDR, an observer,
submitted an application for membership on 16 July 1997.
20.
Asian Development Bank, ‘Greater Mekong Subregion Cross-Border Transport Facilitation Agreement: Instruments and Drafting History’
(2011), 2-3 (www.gms-cbta.org/online-resources).
21.
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Annex 10 should be undertaken with a view to aligning
it to the jurisprudence which has been incrementally built
up around the CMR. That is perhaps an important gap
in this region where inland waterways play such a vital
role in the carriage of goods.
Liability issues
Here too we see a simplified system – under Article 5,
the carrier’s liability shall be assessed simply on the basis
of the Annex. No regard is to be had whether the claim
is actually framed in contract or tort22 and it is not per-
mitted to derogate from the Annex by contract or other-
wise. That seeks to remove any shackles of cumbersome
pleadings or process documentation when a claim is
brought.23 The carrier is also to be vicariously liable for
the acts of his servants, agents, and subcontractors, who
will be entitled to avail themselves of the same defences
as the carrier under this Annex.24
The Annex might thus be said to be shipper friendly – in
its attempt to provide for a simplified liability system.
That is further supported by Article 4(b) which provides
that if the carrier does not make a remark when checking
the goods on acceptance, then goods are presumed to be
complete and in good condition. That should be contras-
ted with Article 9(2) CMR which contains the words
‘unless the contrary is proved’; at least giving the carrier
an opportunity of rebuttal. A GMS carrier should there-
fore do proper checking upon receipt of the goods and
not rely on an opportunity to produce proof after the
event.
The concept of third party protection is recognised as is
consistent with modern carriage conventions but unlike
the Article 3 of the CMR, the words ‘within the scope
of their employment’ are omitted. The express omission
of those words is intended to expedite claims against the
carrier (and its insurers) without countenancing any de-
fence they may have about the third parties acting outside
the scope of their employment. That said, it is neverthe-
less not entirely clear whether an argument could be
raised on the basis that under general law of the relevant
tribunal seised with jurisdiction, the third party could
only benefit from these exemptions and limits if they had
acted in good faith.25 And acting in good faith must surely
mean operating within the scope of their contractual
employment or authority.
Article 9 of the Annex provides that the carrier shall not
be entitled to avail himself/herself of the exoneration or
limitation of liability if the loss, damage, or delay was
caused by his/her, or his/her servants’, agents’, or subcon-
tractors’ wilful misconduct or gross negligence. The
words in Article 29 CMR ‘in accordance with the law of
the court or tribunal seised of the case’ are expressly
omitted. It thus follows that by not making specific pro-
visions on how these terms are to be defined and avoiding
any reference to the law of the court or tribunal seised,
the relevant GMS country should not turn to domestic
law for assistance. Instead, an autonomous interpretation
is to be preferred and, as such, deference to CMR juris-
prudence may thus be justifiable. There has been too
much unnecessary confusion and tension over the inter-
pretation of these concepts as it is.26
The carrier is liable for the same heads of loss as a CMR
carrier – partial loss, total loss, damage and delay in
transit. As for constructive loss, Article 6(b) provides
that if the goods have not been delivered within 30 days
from the expiry of the agreed delivery time, or in the ab-
sence of such an agreement within 60 days from the time
the carrier takes the goods in charge, the goods will be
deemed lost. The consignor/consignee is entitled to claim
compensation for loss. The threshold is the same as the
CMR.
Both loss and damage are subject to same quantum rules.
Under Article 7 of the Annex, the compensation for total
or partial loss of or damage to the goods shall be calcu-
lated by reference to the commodity exchange price or
current market price or else to the normal value of the
goods at the place and time they were accepted for car-
riage.27 The Annex stresses that the compensation scheme
under Article 7 is comprehensive and exhaustive. The
carrier ‘will owe no additional damages’,28 other than
those which are covered by the Annex.
Art. 5(b).22.
That is not to say that it would always be successful given the challenges of corruption, bureaucracy and institutional maladministration
in local settings.
23.
Art. 5(c).24.
Take Thai law for example – its civil law is borrowed from the Swiss Civil Code; Art. 5 of the Civil and Commercial Code states: ‘Every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations, act in good faith’. Lao Contract Law (1990) does not
25.
contain an express good faith principle but does require the parties to perform the contract with sincerity (Art. 18). The Cambodian Civil
Code 2007 provides for a general principle of good faith in all contractual dealings in Art. 5. The Vietnamese Civil Code provides in Art.
389 that ‘The entry into a civil contract must adhere to the following principles: 1. Freedom to enter into the contract, provided that it is
not contrary to law and social ethics; 2. Voluntariness, equality, goodwill, cooperation, honesty and good faith.’ The PRC Contract Law
1999 states in Art. 6 that ‘The parties must act in accordance with the principle of good faith, whether exercising rights or performing
obligations’. Myanmar Contract Law is contained in its Contract Act 1872 which is largely identical to the Indian Contract Act 1872. The
Indian Act in turn might be said to have been influenced by the English common law. There are no provisions on good faith. It should of
course be noted that the Act is not a code and it is thus possible to look outside the Act for principles of law (see s. 13(3) Burmese Laws
Act 1898 where the judges may apply underpinning principles of ‘justice, equity and good conscience’ to determine what the law is and
should be).
See generally and more recently the comments made by F. Sanchez-Gamborino, ‘Article 29 of the CMR Convention concerns nothing
but wilful misconduct of the carrier’, Unif. L. Rev. (2016), 1-13.
26.
Art. 7 also provides that (i) compensation due by the carrier shall not exceed SDR 8.33 per kilogram gross weight of the goods short delivered
or of items damaged. … (iii) In addition, the carrier shall refund in full in case of total loss and in proportion to the loss sustained in case
of partial loss, the carriage charges, customs duties, taxes, and other charges incurred in respect of the carriage of goods.
27.
Art. 7(iv).28.
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It will be recalled that under the CMR, different quantum
rules apply to a claim for loss and a claim for damage.29
Under the Convention, in the case of damage, the carrier
shall be liable for the amount by which the goods have
diminished in value, calculated by reference to the value
of the goods fixed in accordance with Article 23(1)(2)
and (4).30 That means under Annex 10, there is no accom-
modation for deterioration in value.
As to delay, there is no material difference between the
quantum rules under the Annex and the CMR. Article
7(b) provides that compensation due by the carrier for
damage resulting from delay, other than physical damage
affecting the value of the goods, shall be limited to an
amount not exceeding the transport price. Force majeure
is a recognised defence, especially where delay is con-
cerned31 but what is less satisfactory is whether that inter-
vening event occurs after some delay had already been
caused by the carrier. Under PRC law, Article 114 of the
Contract Law 1999 provides that ‘if the force majeure
occurs after one party has delayed in performance, the
liability may not be exempted’.32 Thai law,33 Vietnamese
law,34 Cambodian law,35 Myanmar law36 and Lao law37
do not have a similar provision. As is immediately obvi-
ous, there are issues concerning how substantial or effec-
tive the delay caused prior to the force majeure event
should be and what principles should guide the exercise
of that discretion. It is of course not expected that PRC
law will guide the interpretation and application of this
Article but it is not unusual for national tribunals (also
in the context of the CMR and other transport conven-
tions) to disregard the call to interpret the rules in the
light of their international character. On the basis of a
potential conflict in interpretation, it is submitted that
the matter should be resolved as an issue of causation
rather than general principle of law. It is clear that Article
7 does not provide exhaustively for the application of the
principle of force majeure (especially as regards delay)
but the general principle should apply. However, the
tribunal needs to ascertain properly that the intervening
impossibility had indeed caused the delay. Therein lies
the question of fact.
Claims and limitations
The general tenor of the claims and limitation framework
is similar to that under the CMR. However, it is again
deliberately austere and unadorned. There are no rules
on burden of proof38 – leaving the matter entirely to the
jurisdiction39 seised concerned.
It suffices to point out that the carrier’s defences are
similar to Article 17 CMR. The limitation periods40 are
also similar to those in the CMR; albeit with the omission
of the three months from contract rule in Article 32(i)(c)
CMR.
Concluding Observations
The GMS CBTA is a good example of a sub-regional
transport system which seems to be working – primarily
because of the increased trade in the region and the
growing influence of the PRC in the region. The CBTA
has clearly taken on a new sense of importance with the
accession to its terms by the PRC. However, geo-political
and macroeconomic factors alone are insufficient to
guarantee success of an international transport regime.
The legal rules also need to be sufficiently clear, practic-
able and consistent. It is asserted that Annex 10 of the
GMS CBTA has passed the thresholds of an adequate
piece of regulation for international road carriage – it
benefits from borrowing where appropriate from the
well-established CMR. However, it is also pragmatic. In
order to achieve acceptance from the member countries,
the CBTA is structured in three tiers – a primary agree-
ment containing the general principles, which is supple-
mented by a set of annexes and protocols containing
technical details, and various memoranda of understand-
ing (MOUs) detailing the countries’ bilateral arrange-
ments for implementation. The annexes are clearly easier
to modify as the need arises.
There are however some clear variances between the two
instruments. Annex 10 serves more than just the need to
regulate the carriage of goods by road even though it is
expressed as ‘conditions for transport’. It cannot be ig-
nored that it is part of a larger sub-regional agreement
which promotes transport integration and trade facilita-
tion. As such, we have seen, for example, incorporated
in its provisions references to market competition. An
important difference between the two regimes is the fact
See Arts. 23, 25 CMR respectively.29.
Art. 25(1).30.
Art. 8(a)(i).31.
Emphasis added.32.
See Art. 389 of the Civil and Commercial Code.33.
See Art. 424 of the Civil Code 2005.34.
See Art. 415 of the Civil Code 2007.35.
See s. 56 of the Myanmar Contract Act 1872.36.
See Arts. 36 (general principle of force majeure), 54 (force majeure and bailment) and 62 (force majeure and carriage) Lao Contract Law
(1990).
37.
Cf. Art. 18 CMR.38.
As to the jurisdiction rules, see Art. 10(c) which states:
‘(i) An action for compensation based on this Annex may be brought in the courts of the Contracting Party:
39.
– where the carriage originated from or was destined to;
– where the loss or damage occurred, if localized;
– where the principal place of business of the carrier is located; or
– where the habitual residence of the claimant is located.
(ii) The claim for compensation may also be settled by means of arbitration based on an agreement entered into between parties concerned
after the claim has arisen.’
Art. 10(b).40.
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the Annex is clearly intended to be rudimentary in its
coverage. It tries valiantly to dispense with the legal and
technical nuances and complexities found in the CMR as
far as possible. At one level, that could be criticised for
leading to a less harmonised regulatory system – contrac-
ting states will have to fill in the gaps, as has been dis-
cussed above. On the other hand, given the small number
of member countries and the lead of one or two large
countries, and the fact that regard could be had to CMR
jurisprudence, perhaps this solution is preferable to a full
blown CMR system for the present time. Perhaps this
piecemeal approach is a suitable precursor to full imple-
mentation of the CMR in the region.
As to whether and to what extent the CMR would be
adopted across the ‘one belt one road’ region depends, it
is submitted, on an understanding of the needs and values
provided for in these sub-regional agreements. A positive
observation is that these sub-regional agreements do seek
to borrow from the CMR and thus, a convergence with
the CMR or ultimately complete adoption of the CMR
is not a remote possibility. However, those in the west
seeking to forge ahead with changes to the CMR which
do not take into account the less developed road transit
systems in the east would find the prospects of the CMR
extending eastwards to be quite slim indeed.
7European Journal of Commercial Contract Law 2017-1/2
‘One Belt One Road’, Sub-Regional Transport Agreements and the CMR – a case of mutual dependency?
